Sudan’s War is Anything But Civil
Author
Asil Sidahmed
STRATEGIC ADVISOR AND ANALYST ON AFRICA
Aug 07 2024
Sudan’s protracted and deadly war is not merely a civil conflict, as is often, and sloppily, claimed. Rather, it represents a complex struggle deeply rooted in the nation’s fraught transition to democracy. Following the end of Omar al-Bashir's thirty-year authoritarian rule, Sudan has faced numerous challenges in establishing a stable, civilian-led government. This article explores crucial historical context, the key players involved, and the internal and external factors driving the ongoing turmoil in the country[1].
A transitional government was formed under the premiership of Abdalla Hamdok in 2019, lasting until October 2021, with the appointment of two cabinets: the first was technocratic and the second was based on political party representation.
Significantly, in 2019, the military maneuvered its way back into what was intended to be a civilian-led and civilian-only transition, forming part of the supreme governance council and tightening the grip, as well as the legitimacy, of individuals who had blood on their hands from acts of genocide committed during the war in Darfur, Western Sudan, that began in the early 2000s and ended officially in August 2020.
This Rapid Security Forces (RSF) became a powerful paramilitary group within a larger military that was outsourced and used by the Bashir regime to extend its authoritarian reach and carry out extra-legal forms of violence such as assassinations and killings, most notably in the acts of genocide experienced in Darfur.
Rather than simply viewing what is happening in Sudan today as yet another localised conflict in an African country[2], it is important to situate the ongoing events within the larger context of the revolution to overthrow Bashir’s authoritarian rule. The revolution initially took root in the peripheries of the country, beginning with the infamous bread lines, and then spread organically across the country, leading to widespread demonstrations including in the capital Khartoum.
Peripheries are an important part of the broader discussion because they are also the places where the military and the Rapid Security Forces operate from. Between December 2018 and the 3rd June, 2019, the RSF were deployed to target and assassinate largely peaceful protesters on the ground. Despite the violence and brute force unleashed by members of the RSF, in 2019, the RSF leader, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, saw an opportunity to be folded into the transition with impunity, and took it.
By the time sufficient pressure was put on Omar al-Bashir to step down and an exit strategy was conjured, a deal was brokered in which there would be a purely civilian-led transitional government. But on the 3rd of June, security forces cleared a sit-in protest and unleashed a campaign of terror, killing over 120 protesters, many of them youth, in an event that became known as the “Khartoum Massacre” and altered Sudan forever.
The weight of the military forces and the RSF was reintroduced to broker a new transitional deal. The second transitional deal is the one that held and led to a split within the civilian population. The civilian parties then either pulled out of the transition, including, for example, the Communist Party, or engaged in “quiet quitting”, a form of disengagement where they were present but not active and largely sceptical of any promising outcome. On the other end of the spectrum, new political parties emerged that believed there could be no transition at all without the presence of the military, claiming they would be a spoiler to the process if not integrated from the start.
The military leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan emerged as the head of the Supreme Council, and, according to many, deliberately disrupted the transitional process in 2021. On the other hand, the RSF leader Dagalo spent this time rehabilitating his image and courting International Humanitarian Law (IHL) workshops organised by international organisations and donors. Al-Burhan and Dagalo made for strange bedfellows.
At this point, Omar al-Bashir did not get the soft and sweet “exit package” received by the fallen leaders of other Arab Springs or similar transitional or attempted transitional processes, such as the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Rather than exiting with impunity, he was indicted by the ICC, an action that had been long-awaited and anticipated by the people of Sudan.
A core factor that tends to make impunity appealing in peace processes and transitions, however, is that leaders who form the lynchpin of the entire State need to be incentivised to loosen their grip on power, which is what we’re seeing now in Syria, for example.
That being said, it is unclear whether impunity was ultimately beneficial in the case of Yemen, nor did it help with the closing of the fifteen-year-long Lebanese civil war in 1990. Omar al-Bashir had successfully created a regime apparatus that was larger than him, often referred to as the “Ingaz system”. It constituted a system of rule and a network of people who were deeply embedded in the ministries, as well as a network of corruption that saw the banks play the currency for benefit and a multiplication of bank accounts created under US sanctions. Loopholes were created to receive foreign aid and all sorts of creative methods were used to transfer money both within and outside of the country.
As a member of the British-Sudanese diaspora, committed wholeheartedly to the people’s revolution, it was a double-edged sword to be given both the privilege and the horror of witnessing the level of destruction that the Bashir era had inflicted upon all layers of the public system, making it near impossible to recover, even if conditions had remained equal. Access to pharmaceuticals, for example, was compromised by the sheer levels of debt accrued at the hands of the National Drugs Council during the Bashir era. He had also created an economy that had markers of other regional failing economies: a banking crisis, soaring inflation, over-reliance on diaspora remittances, and a misuse and exploitation of comparative advantage. The wheat economy, as Khair, Craze, and Magawi point out[3], was systematically exploited by the State. In my view, the fact that the Bashir dictatorship, like many others in the region, was borne out of both the Muslim brotherhood and a Bretton Woods economic system with the local currency pegged to an anchor currency, the USD, forms an important explanatory framework from an economic viewpoint for the ongoing struggle for political and social democracy.
What took place during the transition was a balancing act between the customary systems used by civil servants to deliver basic services and a wave of formalising of the system when as always crippling IMF and World Bank loans were put on the table. These loans of course, were not without their conditions, and notably came after the country’s normalisation with Israel in 2020.
Bank accounts that had long been emptied left transitional leaders with little to no hope of gaining eventual legitimacy.
Throughout the process of the civilian transition, other militias that had been marginalised and oppressed under the rule of Omar al-Bashir, including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), for example, suddenly re-emerged in Darfur. These actors now take part in a process called the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA). The transitional period can be divided between two main phases between the revolution of 2018-2019 and the military coup that subsequently took place in 2021. There were essentially two types of transition: the first was technocratic, meaning people were appointed to manage and run the day-to-day of the ministries as custodians to attain a workable process of elections. The second involved political parties appointing representatives from over fourty political parties within the context of a political landscape that had seen a unilateral one-party-rule state for over thirty years, with many scrambling to understand and negotiate with each other a nascent democratic process.
Sudan was suddenly witnessing a political environment where parties, having been out of power for over thirty years, suddenly found themselves in charge of governance. Such parties, lacking practical ruling experience, faced significant challenges that could lead to potential missteps. This scenario is reminiscent of the Liberal Democrats' opportunistic coalition with the Conservative Party in the UK context, which turned out to be a problematic and chaotic partnership on many levels. Lack of experience and preparedness must not be underestimated, and can lead to a governance "mess," highlighting the importance of readiness and expertise in political leadership.
In 2021, political parties, largely lacking in governance experience and the necessary processes or structures for consensus and decision-making, faced a real mess. This was exacerbated by an entirely looted state, leaving the government coffers empty. During this period of transition, leaders like al-Burhan and Dagolo had to navigate these immense challenges. The absence of established systems and financial resources made it difficult to implement effective governance, leading to a chaotic and unstable political environment. Their efforts during this period were critical in shaping any future governance framework.
It was a slow boil of essentially undermining the government and having a population that doubted the efficacy of democracy, believing it just wouldn’t work for them. What therefore transpired in 2021 was a number of counter-protests that essentially asked for a return to military rule. The growing belief that democracy was ineffective created a unique and troubling dynamic during this period of political transition. When al-Burhan returned, he didn’t openly declare a continuation of the previous dictatorship. Rather, he employed a more subtle narrative. While he did enact a rash and violent move by kidnapping the transitional Prime Minister Hamdok, signaling a return to authoritarian rule and tactics, he came short of explicitly stating that this was the direction he was headed in. This dual approach created a complex and contradictory message, blending covert authoritarian actions with overt assurances, complicating the overall political landscape during the transition period.
His reason for the effective coup was that he was doing so for the Prime Minister's safety, suggesting he was not up to the task. Al-Burhan asserted that he could instead manage the transition, professing a belief in a democratic process and wanting it to work for the people. Meanwhile, Dagolo had been working on what can only be described as a PR campaign. A man with no educational degrees or formal qualifications, with weak command of barely one language, he nevertheless managed to court the likes of the ICRC to get training in IHL to launch an online campaign in an attempt to win popularity from the masses.
Al-Burhan has been likened to a mafia leader with an array of both legal and illegal business interests. All of this during the entire period of al-Bashir's rule, particularly in the latter years, when the country’s economy was heavily burdened by US sanctions.
These sanctions were lifted during the transition period, but only after the brokerage of a deal. It is, of course, imperative to note that when a country in the region is at its weakest and most desperate, bankrupt and in dire need of IMF loans, the number one thing the US will do is attempt to exert maximum pressure in the name of its own political and economic interests. This often involves making significant demands that leverage the country's vulnerable position to achieve strategic or political goals. Under the rule of former President Donald Trump, the US insisted on Sudan normalising relations with Israel as a condition for lifting sanctions. This period saw an increase in Israeli influence over Sudan. The RSF adopted strategies conspicuously taken from the Israeli playbook, including making deals with Nigerian ministries involved in counter-terrorism. This influence extended beyond diplomatic relations to military and strategic cooperation, significantly impacting Sudan's transition and regional dynamics, with many having deals in South Africa. What is less documented, however, are the deals with militias such as the RSF that not only gain weapons from them but also training.
Despite this, al-Burhan and Hemedti used the transition as their rhetoric and their tool for popular legitimacy. Al-Burhan effectively ended the transition in October 2021 by holding Hamdok hostage and staging a military coup whilst proclaiming that he was setting the transition on a correct course. For some, the revolution never started the transition, because it was hijacked by the military from the beginning. Whilst for others, the compromise of keeping members of the military on side meant that the transition had a way forward.
Today the country faces a severe deadlock for peace talks with the UAE’s involvement, and 2.5 million people are expected to die from the world’s largest famine. Yet, aid reaching Sudan is woefully low. While it can be benign to say that it is simply invisible and just another war taking place on the African continent, we need to stop and consider if this war, like many others, is actually invisible, or rather invisibilised.
In conclusion, Sudan's path to democracy remains obstructed by deep-seated political rivalries and external pressures. As the failed talks in Geneva last week evidenced[4]. The interplay between military power and civilian governance, compounded by international influences, continues to destabilize the region. Addressing these challenges requires a nuanced understanding of Sudan's history and a concerted effort from both domestic and international actors to support a genuine and sustainable transition to peace and democracy.
About the BIC
The BIC is an independent, non-profit, think-and-do tank based in the capital of Europe that is committed to developing solutions to address the cyclical drivers of insecurity, economic fragility, and conflict the Middle East and North Africa. Our goal is to bring added value to the highest levels of political discourse by bringing systemic issues to the forefront of the conversation.
| Beyond Securitization: Building Resilience in the South Series Moving beyond a sole focus on securitization and border management, we undertake a bottom-up approach to issues as regional integration, traditional and new mobility patterns, border economies, democratic transition and socioeconomic wellbeing, using both quantitative and qualitative data. | Author Asil Sidahmed | STRATEGIC ADVISOR AND ANALYST ON AFRICA
[1] https://andariya.com/post/out-of-sight-out-of-mind-how-sudan-faded-from-the-headlines-and-public-concern-1
[2] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudan-year-war
[3] Sudan Starves Joshua Craze, Kholood Khair, and Raga Makawi June 23, 2024 https://www.nybooks.com/online/2024/06/23/sudan-starves/
[4] https://timep.org/2024/08/14/breaking-the-cycle-can-geneva-succeed-where-jeddah-failed-in-sudan/